University of Southern California
Research Group

AAAI Spring Symposium 2015 on
Applied Computational Game Theory

Schedule

Schedule is now available here

Description

Game theory's popularity continues to increase in a whole variety of disciplines, e.g. economics, biology, political science, computer science, electrical engineering, business, law, public policy, and many others. The focus of this symposium is to bring together the community working on Applied Computational Game Theory motivated by any of these domains.

A variety of very large-scale real-world problems can be cast in game-theoretic contexts. For example, software assistants based on game theory have been developed for generating randomized patrol plans to protect computer networks, ports, airports, flights and transit systems. Also game theory has been utilized for disaster management, medical record inspections and mechanism design for markets. Further, interdisciplinary work of game theory and machine learning has been applied to domains such as spam detection, fishery protection and poaching prevention where the repeated interactions between players are involved. Another area with growing interest is computer poker, where the presence of imperfect information in the game raises important new challenges.

While there has been significant progress, there still exist many major challenges facing the design of effective approaches to deal with the difficulties in these real-world domains. These may include building predictive behavioral models for the players, dealing with uncertainties in games, scaling up for large games, learning in repeated games. Addressing these challenges requires collaboration from different communities including artificial intelligence, game theory, operations research, social science, and psychology. This symposium is structured to encourage a lively exchange of ideas between members from these communities. We encourage all researchers working towards applying computational game theory for real-world problems to submit to the symposium.

Topics

Topics of interest include but are not limited to:
+ Real-world applications of game theory
+ Game theory foundations
+ Algorithms for scaling to very large games
+ Behavioral game theory
+ Modeling uncertainty in game theoretic applications
+ Learning in games
+ Imperfect information in games and computer poker
+ Agent/human interaction for preference elicitation and optimization
+ Risk Analysis
+ Applied Mechanism Design for Markets, Auctions

Accepted Papers

  • Adam Ackerman, Elizabeth Carpenter, Robert Gutierrez and Sierra Kelly.
    Effectiveness of Incorporating Adversary Probability Perception Modeling in Security Games
  • Ian Gemp and Sridhar Mahadevan.
    Finding Equilibria in Large Games using Variational Inequalities [Slides]
  • Ariel Procaccia, Sashank Reddi and Nisarg Shah.
    Privacy-Preserving Coordination in Security Games
  • Swetasudha Panda and Yevgeniy Vorobeychik.
    Stackelberg Games for Antibody Design
  • Haifeng Xu, Zinovi Rabinovich,Shaddin Dughmi and Milind Tambe.
    Two-Stage Security Game -- Exploring Information Asymmetry [Slides]
  • Mason Wright and Yevgeniy Vorobeychik.
    Designing Fair, Efficient, and Incentive Compatible Team Formation Markets [Slides]
  • Rui Zou, Mengzhe Zhang and Sourabh Bhattacharya.
    Decentralized Multi-agent Visibility Based Target Tracking Game
  • Galina Schwartz, Patrick Loiseau and Shankar Sastry.
    The Heterogeneous Colonel Blotto Game
  • Viliam Lisy, Robert Kessl and Tomas Pevny.
    Randomized Operating Point Selection in Adversarial Classification
  • Jun Zhuang.
    Validating Attacker-Defender Games using Experiments and Surveys
  • Nolan Bard and Michael Bowling.
    Decision-theoretic Clustering of Strategies [Slides]
  • Fei Fang, Peter Stone and Milind Tambe.
    Defender Strategies In Domains Involving Frequent Adversary Interaction
  • Debarun Kar, Fei Fang, Francesco Maria Delle Fave, Nicole Sintov, Milind Tambe and Arlette Wissen.
    Effectiveness of Probability Perception Modeling and Defender Strategy Generation Algorithms in Repeated Stackelberg Games
  • Kevin Waugh, Dustin Morrill, Drew Bagnell and Michael Bowling.
    Integrating Abstraction and Equilibrium Computation [Slides]
  • Atsushi Iwasaki, Tadashi Sekiguchi, Shun Yamamoto and Makoto Yokoo.
    Can local caution restore global tacit collusion?: Repeated multimarket contact with observation errors [Slides]
  • Karel Durkota, Viliam Lisy, Branislav Bosansky and Christopher Kiekintveld.
    Network Security Hardening Based on Optimal Attack Planning
  • Richard Klima, Christopher Kiekintveld and Viliam Lisy.
    Online Learning Methods for Border Patrol Resource Allocation
  • Aaron Kolb and Vincent Conitzer.
    Repeated Advice with a Strategic Adversary
  • Jinshu Cui and Richard John.
    Modeling Adversary Risk Attitude, Trade-offs among Multiple Objectives, and Consistency in Stackelberg Security Games [Slides]
  • Felipe Lagos, Fernando Ordonez and Martine Labbe.
    Column Generation for a Strong Formulation of Stackelberg Games
  • Catherine Moon and Vincent Conitzer.
    What Goes Around Comes Around: Maximal Cooperation in Repeated Games on Social Networks
  • Sarah Kusumastuti, Jinshu Cui, Arjun Tambe and Richard John.
    A Behavioral Game Modeling Cyber Attackers, Defenders, and Users [Slides]
  • Jeremiah Blocki, Nicolas Christin, Anupam Datta, Ariel Procaccia and Arunesh Sinha.
    Audit Games with Multiple Defender Resources [Slides]
  • Yundi Qian, William Haskell and Milind Tambe.
    Robust Strategy against Risk Averse Adversaries in Security Games
  • Paul Wood, Saurabh Bagchi and Alefiya Hussain.
    Optimizing Defensive Investments in Interdependent Cyber-Physical Systems

Chair and Main Contact

Fei Fang
University of Southern California
Salvatori Computer Science Center (SAL) 300,
941 Bloom Walk, Los Angeles,
CA 90089, United States
Phone: (213) 740-7231
Email: feifang [AT] usc [DOT] edu

Organizing Committee

+ Christopher Kiekintveld (University of Texas at El Paso, cdkiekintveld@utep.edu)
+ Yevgeniy Vorobeychik (Vanderbilt University, eug.vorobey@gmail.com)
+ Peter Stone (University of Texas at Austin, pstone@cs.utexas.edu)
+ Bo An (Nanyang Technological University, boan@ntu.edu.sg)
+ Manish Jain (Armorway, manish.jain.85@gmail.com)
+ Fei Fang (University of Southern California, feifang@usc.edu)
+ Albert Xin Jiang (Trinity University, albertjiang@gmail.com)

Event Photos

         


Venue Information

AAAI 2015 Spring Symposium Series is to be held March 23-25, 2015, at Stanford University in Palo Alto, California. For more information, please refer to the AAAI Symposium website.

Submission Information

Deadline Extension: Submissions should be made through the online submission system by 11:59 PM PST, October 17th, 2014. All submissions should be made in AAAI format (AuthorKit), and should be up to 8 pages in length, including figures and references. Authors shall be notified by November 7th, 2014.

Note to authors and reviewers: The submissions to this symposium will NOT be published. Instead, a set of working notes may be used during the symposium and they will not be distributed beyond the symposium without permission. As such, some of the submissions may also be under review at other venues. The submissions to this symposium are only for review for oral presentation, and with an explicit understanding that no conflict is posed. If the authors or reviewers believe that there is a conflict, please let the organizers know.