

Supplemental Material: Controlling Elections through Social Influence

1 Missing proofs

We now provide proofs that were deferred from the main text. We start out with with the full proofs for the MOV_C and MOV_D objectives:

Theorem 4.1: *In an election with two candidates, MOV is a monotone submodular function.*

Proof. We first fix a particular scenario y and show that the function $f(\cdot, y, V_{c_*}^2)$ is submodular. This suffices to show that $\mathbb{E}_y[f(\cdot, y, V_{c_*}^2)]$ is submodular since a nonnegative linear combination of submodular functions remains submodular. Monotonicity is clear since adding additional seeds to A can only make more nodes reachable. To show submodularity, we can write the marginal gain as

$$f(A \cup \{x\}, y, V_{c_*}^2) - f(A, y, V_{c_*}^2) = \sum_{v \in V_{c_*}^2} (1 - \chi(v, A, y)) \chi(v, \{x\}, y).$$

Compare the above expression for a set A and any $B \supseteq A$. For any single node v , $\chi(v, B, y) = 1$ whenever $\chi(v, A, y) = 1$. Hence, the term in the above summation for each node v can only be smaller for $f(B \cup \{x\}, y, V_{c_*}^2) - f(B, y, V_{c_*}^2)$ than for $f(A \cup \{x\}, y, V_{c_*}^2) - f(A, y, V_{c_*}^2)$. We conclude that $f(A \cup \{x\}, y, V_{c_*}^2) - f(A, y, V_{c_*}^2) \geq f(B \cup \{x\}, y, V_{c_*}^2) - f(B, y, V_{c_*}^2)$ and submodularity now follows by taking the expectation over y . \square

Theorem 5.2: *MOVCONSTRUCTIVE obtains a $\frac{1}{3} (1 - \frac{1}{e})$ -approximation to the MOV_C problem with any number of candidates.*

Proof. Let $c(S, y) = \arg \min_{c_i} f(V_{c_*}^2 \cap V_{c_i}^1) - |V_{c_i}^1|$ be the candidate achieving the minimum in the definition of m_C . Let S^* be an optimal seed set. Note that for all scenarios y , seed sets S , and candidates c_i , $f(S, y, V_{c_*}^2) \geq f(S, y, V_{c_*}^2 \cap V_{c_i}^1)$. Hence, we have

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbb{E}_y \left[f(S^*, y, V_{c_*}^2) \right] &\geq \frac{1}{3} \mathbb{E}_y \left[f(S^*, y, V_{c_*}^1) + f(S^*, y, V_{c_*}^1 \cap V_{c(S^*, y)}^1) \right. \\ &\quad \left. + f(S^*, y, V_{c_*}^1 \cap V_{c(S, y)}^1) \right] \end{aligned}$$

Note that $\mathbb{E}_y[f(\cdot, y, V_{c_*}^2)]$ is a monotone submodular function, which MOVCONSTRUCTIVE greedily maximizes. Let S be the resulting seed set. We have

$$\begin{aligned}
& \mathbb{E}_y \left[f(S, y, V_{c_*}^2) + f(S, y, V_{c_*}^2 \cap V_{c(S,y)}^1) \right] \\
& \geq \mathbb{E}_y \left[f(S, y, V_{c_*}^2) \right] \\
& \geq \frac{1}{3} \left(1 - \frac{1}{e} \right) \mathbb{E}_y \left[f(S^*, y, V_{c_*}^2) + f(S^*, y, V_{c_*}^2 \cap V_{c(S^*,y)}^1) \right] \\
& \quad + f(S^*, y, V_{c_*}^2 \cap V_{c(S,y)}^1) \Big]
\end{aligned}$$

and so

$$\begin{aligned}
& \text{MOV}_C(S) \\
& = \mathbb{E}_y \left[f(S, y, V_{c_*}^2) + \min_{c_j} f(S, y, V_{c_*}^2 \cap V_{c_j}^1) + \max_{c_i} |V_{c_i}^1| - |V_{c_j}^1| \right] \\
& = \mathbb{E}_y \left[f(S, y, V_{c_*}^2) + f(S, y, V_{c_*}^2 \cap V_{c(S,y)}^1) \right] + \max_{c_i} |V_{c_i}^1| - \mathbb{E}_y \left[|V_{c(S,y)}^1| \right] \\
& \geq \frac{1}{3} \left(1 - \frac{1}{e} \right) \mathbb{E}_y \left[f(S^*, y, V_{c_*}^1) + f(S^*, y, V_{c_*}^2 \cap V_{c(S^*,y)}^1) \right] \\
& \quad + f(S^*, y, V_{c_*}^2 \cap V_{c(S,y)}^1) \Big] + \max_{c_i} |V_{c_i}^1| - \mathbb{E}_y \left[|V_{c(S,y)}^1| \right] \\
& \geq \frac{1}{3} \left(1 - \frac{1}{e} \right) \mathbb{E}_y \left[f(S^*, y, V_{c_*}^1) + f(S^*, y, V_{c_*}^2 \cap V_{c(S^*,y)}^1) \right] \\
& \quad + f(S^*, y, V_{c_*}^1 \cap V_{c(S,y)}^1) + \max_{c_i} |V_{c_i}^1| - |V_{c(S,y)}^1| \Big] \\
& = \frac{1}{3} \left(1 - \frac{1}{e} \right) \mathbb{E}_y \left[f(S^*, y, V_{c_*}^1) + f(S^*, y, V_{c_*}^2 \cap V_{c(S^*,y)}^1) \right] \\
& \quad + f(S^*, y, V_{c_*}^1 \cap V_{c(S,y)}^1) + \max_{c_i} |V_{c_i}^1| - |V_{c(S,y)}^1| + |V_{c(S^*,y)}^1| - |V_{c(S^*,y)}^1| \Big] \\
& = \frac{1}{3} \left(1 - \frac{1}{e} \right) \mathbb{E}_y \left[f(S^*, y, V_{c_*}^1) + \min_{c_j} \left(f(S^*, y, V_{c_*}^2 \cap V_{c_j}^1) - |V_{c_j}^1| \right) \right] \\
& \quad + f(S^*, y, V_{c_*}^2 \cap V_{c(S,y)}^1) + \max_{c_i} |V_{c_i}^1| - |V_{c(S,y)}^1| + |V_{c(S^*,y)}^1| \Big] \\
& = \frac{1}{3} \left(1 - \frac{1}{e} \right) \left(\text{MOV}_C(S^*) + \mathbb{E}_y \left[f(S^*, y, V_{c_*}^2 \cap V_{c(S,y)}^1) \right] \right. \\
& \quad \left. + |V_{c(S^*,y)}^1| - |V_{c(S,y)}^1| \right).
\end{aligned}$$

Now by definition of $c(S^*, y)$, $f(S^*, y, V_{c_*}^2 \cap V_{c(S^*,y)}^1) - |V_{c(S^*,y)}^1| \leq f(S^*, y, V_{c_*}^2 \cap V_{c(S,y)}^1) - |V_{c(S,y)}^1|$ and so

$$|V_{c(S^*,y)}^1| - |V_{c(S,y)}^1| \geq f(S^*, y, V_{c_*}^2 \cap V_{c(S^*,y)}^1) - f(S^*, y, V_{c_*}^2 \cap V_{c(S,y)}^1)$$

This yields

$$\text{MOV}_C(S) \geq \frac{1}{3} \left(1 - \frac{1}{e} \right) \left(\text{MOV}_C(S^*) + \mathbb{E}_y \left[f(S^*, y, V_{c_*}^2 \cap V_{c(S,y)}^1) \right] + \right.$$

$$\begin{aligned}
& f\left(S^*, y, V_{c_*}^2 \cap V_{c(S^*, y)}^1\right) - f\left(S^*, y, V_{c_*}^2 \cap V_{c(S, y)}^1\right) \Big] \\
&= \frac{1}{3} \left(1 - \frac{1}{e}\right) \left(\text{MOV}_C(S^*) + \mathbb{E}_y \left[f\left(S^*, y, V_{c_*}^2 \cap V_{c(S^*, y)}^1\right) \right] \right) \\
&\geq \frac{1}{3} \left(1 - \frac{1}{e}\right) \text{MOV}_C(S^*).
\end{aligned}$$

□

Theorem 5.3: *MOVDESTRUCTIVE obtains a $\frac{1}{2} \left(1 - \frac{1}{e}\right)$ -approximation to the multicandidate MOV_D problem.*

Proof. Now let $c(S, y) = \arg \max_{c_i} f(V_{c_*}^1 \cap V_{c_i}^2) + |V_{c_i}^1|$ be the candidate achieving the maximum in the definition of m_D . Let S^* be an optimal seed set. Similarly to before, we have

$$\mathbb{E}_y \left[f\left(S^*, y, V_{c_*}^1\right) \right] \geq \frac{1}{2} \mathbb{E}_y \left[f\left(S^*, y, V_{c_*}^1\right) + f\left(S^*, y, V_{c_*}^1 \cap V_{c(S^*, y)}^2\right) \right].$$

MOVDESTRUCTIVE greedily maximizes $\mathbb{E}_y \left[f\left(S^*, y, V_{c_*}^1\right) \right]$. Call the resulting seed set S . We have

$$\begin{aligned}
& \text{MOV}_D(S) \\
&= \mathbb{E}_y \left[f\left(S, y, V_{c_*}^1\right) + f\left(S, y, V_{c_*}^1 \cap V_{c(S, y)}^2\right) + |V_{c(S, y)}^1| - \max_{c_i} |V_{c_i}^1| \right] \\
&\geq \left(1 - \frac{1}{e}\right) \mathbb{E}_y \left[f\left(S^*, y, V_{c_*}^1\right) \right] + \mathbb{E}_y \left[f\left(S, y, V_{c_*}^1 \cap V_{c(S, y)}^2\right) \right. \\
&\quad \left. + |V_{c(S, y)}^1| - \max_{c_i} |V_{c_i}^1| \right] \\
&\geq \frac{1}{2} \left(1 - \frac{1}{e}\right) \mathbb{E}_y \left[f\left(S^*, y, V_{c_*}^1\right) + f\left(S^*, y, V_{c_*}^1 \cap V_{c(S^*, y)}^2\right) \right] \\
&\quad + \mathbb{E}_y \left[f\left(S, y, V_{c_*}^1 \cap V_{c(S, y)}^2\right) + |V_{c(S, y)}^1| - \max_{c_i} |V_{c_i}^1| \right] \\
&\geq \frac{1}{2} \left(1 - \frac{1}{e}\right) \mathbb{E}_y \left[f\left(S^*, y, V_{c_*}^1\right) + f\left(S^*, y, V_{c_*}^1 \cap V_{c(S^*, y)}^2\right) \right. \\
&\quad \left. + f\left(S, y, V_{c_*}^1 \cap V_{c(S, y)}^2\right) + |V_{c(S, y)}^1| - \max_{c_i} |V_{c_i}^1| \right] \\
&\geq \frac{1}{2} \left(1 - \frac{1}{e}\right) \mathbb{E}_y \left[f\left(S^*, y, V_{c_*}^1\right) + f\left(S^*, y, V_{c_*}^1 \cap V_{c(S^*, y)}^2\right) \right. \\
&\quad \left. + f\left(S, y, V_{c_*}^1 \cap V_{c(S, y)}^2\right) + |V_{c(S, y)}^1| + |V_{c(S^*, y)}^1| - |V_{c(S^*, y)}^1| - \max_{c_i} |V_{c_i}^1| \right] \\
&\geq \frac{1}{2} \left(1 - \frac{1}{e}\right) \left[\text{MOV}_D(S^*) + \mathbb{E}_y \left[f\left(S, y, V_{c_*}^1 \cap V_{c(S, y)}^2\right) \right. \right. \\
&\quad \left. \left. + |V_{c(S, y)}^1| - |V_{c(S^*, y)}^1| \right] \right].
\end{aligned}$$

Now using the definition of $c(S, y)$, we have that $f(S, y, V_{c_*}^1 \cap V_{c(S, y)}^2) + |V_{c(S, y)}^1| \geq f(S, y, V_{c_*}^1 \cap V_{c(S^*, y)}^2) + |V_{c(S^*, y)}^1|$. This yields

$$|V_{c(S,y)}^1| - |V_{c(S^*,y)}^1| \geq f\left(S, y, V_{c_*}^1 \cap V_{c(S^*,y)}^2\right) - f\left(S, y, V_{c_*}^1 \cap V_{c(S,y)}^2\right)$$

and so we have

$$\begin{aligned} \text{MOV}_D(S) &\geq \frac{1}{2} \left(1 - \frac{1}{e}\right) \left[\text{MOV}_D(S^*) + \mathbb{E}_y \left[f\left(S, y, V_{c_*}^1 \cap V_{c(S^*,y)}^2\right) \right] \right] \\ &\geq \frac{1}{2} \left(1 - \frac{1}{e}\right) \text{MOV}_D(S^*) \end{aligned}$$

□

We now prove corresponding bicriteria guarantees for the POV objectives.

Theorem 5.4: *Let $\text{OPT}(\Delta)$ denote the optimal value of the problem $\max_{|S| \leq k} \Pr_y [m_C(S, y) \geq \Delta]$. Let S be the set produced by POVCONSTRUCTIVE . We have*

$$\text{POV}_C(S) \geq \max_{0 < \alpha < 1} \frac{\frac{e-1}{3e-1} \text{OPT}\left(\frac{1}{\alpha} \Delta\right) - \alpha}{1 - \alpha}$$

Proof. The main difference from the two candidate case is that $\frac{1}{m} \sum_y \min(\beta, m_C(S, y))$ is no longer submodular since m_C need not be a submodular function. However, the proof of Theorem 4.3 only uses submodularity in establishing an approximation guarantee for greedy optimization of the surrogate. In the multicandidate case, we will greedily optimize $\frac{1}{m} \sum_y \min(\beta, f(S, y, V_{c_*}^2))$, which is submodular. Let S_β be the resulting seed set and S^* be a set that optimizes $\frac{1}{m} \sum_y \min(\beta, m_C(S, y))$. If we can prove that $\frac{1}{m} \sum_y \min(\beta, m_C(S_\beta, y)) \geq \gamma \frac{1}{m} \sum_y \min(\beta, m_C(S^*, y))$ for some constant factor γ , then the same argument as in Theorem 4.3 extends to the multicandidate case. Fix any particular value of β . We establish a constant factor approximation as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} &\frac{1}{m} \sum_y \min(\beta, m_C(S^*, y)) \\ &= \frac{1}{m} \sum_y \min(\beta, m_C(S_\beta, y) + m_C(S^*, y) - m_C(S_\beta, y)) \\ &\leq \frac{1}{m} \sum_y \min\left(\beta, m_C(S_\beta, y) + f(S^*, y, V_{c_*}^2) - f(S_\beta, y, V_{c_*}^2)\right) \\ &\quad + f\left(S^*, y, V_{c_*}^2 \cap V_{c(S^*,y)}^1\right) - f\left(S_\beta, y, V_{c_*}^2 \cap V_{c(S_\beta,y)}^1\right) \\ &\quad + |V_{c(S_\beta,y)}^1| - |V_{c(S^*,y)}^1| \end{aligned}$$

Via the definition of $c(S^*, y)$, we have that $|V_{c(S_\beta,y)}^1| - |V_{c(S^*,y)}^1| \leq f\left(S^*, y, V_{c_*}^2 \cap V_{c(S_\beta,y)}^1\right) - f\left(S^*, y, V_{c_*}^2 \cap V_{c(S^*,y)}^1\right)$. This yields

$$\frac{1}{m} \sum_y \min(\beta, m_C(S^*, y))$$

$$\begin{aligned}
&\leq \frac{1}{m} \sum_y \min \left(\beta, m_C(S_\beta, y) + f(S^*, y, V_{c_*}^2) + f(S^*, y, V_{c_*}^2 \cap V_{c(S_\beta, y)}^1) \right) \\
&\leq \frac{1}{m} \sum_y \min \left(\beta, m_C(S_\beta, y) + 2f(S^*, y, V_{c_*}^2) \right) \\
&\leq \frac{1}{m} \sum_y \min \left(\beta, m_C(S_\beta, y) \right) + \frac{2}{m} \sum_y \min \left(\beta, f(S^*, y, V_{c_*}^2) \right) \\
&\leq \frac{1}{m} \sum_y \min \left(\beta, m_C(S_\beta, y) \right) + \frac{1}{m} \frac{2e}{e-1} \sum_y \min \left(\beta, f(S_\beta, y, V_{c_*}^2) \right) \\
&\leq \frac{1}{m} \sum_y \min \left(\beta, m_C(S_\beta, y) \right) + \frac{1}{m} \frac{2e}{e-1} \sum_y \min \left(\beta, m_C(S_\beta, y) \right) \\
&\leq \left(1 + \frac{2e}{e-1} \right) \frac{1}{m} \sum_y \min \left(\beta, m_C(S_\beta, y) \right)
\end{aligned}$$

and now the conclusion follows by applying the same argument as in Theorem 4.3. \square

Theorem 5.5: *Let $OPT(\Delta)$ denote the optimal value of the problem $\max_{|S| \leq k} \Pr_y [m_D(S, y) \geq \Delta]$. Let S be the set produced by POVDSTRUCTIVE. We have*

$$POVD(S) \geq \max_{0 < \alpha < 1} \frac{\frac{e-1}{3e-1} OPT(\frac{1}{\alpha} \Delta) - \alpha}{1 - \alpha}$$

Proof. Applying the reasoning as in Theorem 5.4, we have

$$\begin{aligned}
&\frac{1}{m} \sum_y \min(\Delta, m_D(S^*, y)) \\
&= \frac{1}{m} \sum_y \min(\Delta, m_C(S, y) + m_D(S^*, y) - m_D(S, y)) \\
&\leq \frac{1}{m} \sum_y \min \left(\Delta, m_D(S, y) + f(S^*, y, V_{c_*}^1) - f(S, y, V_{c_*}^1) \right. \\
&\quad \left. + f(S^*, y, V_{c_*}^1 \cap V_{c(S^*, y)}^2) - f(S, y, V_{c_*}^1 \cap V_{c(S, y)}^2) \right. \\
&\quad \left. + |V_{c(S^*, y)}^1| - |V_{c(S, y)}^1| \right).
\end{aligned}$$

The definition of $c(S, y)$ implies that

$$|V_{c(S^*, y)}^1| - |V_{c(S, y)}^1| \leq f(S, y, V_{c_*}^1 \cap V_{c(S, y)}^2) - f(S, y, V_{c_*}^1 \cap V_{c(S^*, y)}^2)$$

so we have

$$\begin{aligned}
&\frac{1}{m} \sum_y \min(\Delta, m_D(S^*, y)) \\
&\leq \frac{1}{m} \sum_y \min \left(\Delta, m_D(S, y) + f(S^*, y, V_{c_*}^1) + f(S^*, y, V_{c_*}^1 \cap V_{c(S^*, y)}^2) \right) \\
&\leq \frac{1}{m} \sum_y \min \left(\Delta, m_D(S, y) + 2f(S^*, y, V_{c_*}^1) \right)
\end{aligned}$$

and now the theorem follows from the same argument as in Theorem 5.3. □

2 Additional experimental results




Figure 1: Probability of victory in constructive control. Left: irvine. Right: facebook




Figure 2: Probability of victory in destructive control. Left: irvine. Right: facebook. On irvine, the MILP was terminated after 24 hours, and had not found competitive solutions with the approximation algorithm on the intermediate margin instances by that time.